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I. Introduction
A. RECENT CHANGES TO BANKING AND
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEXICO
The Mexican banking and financial structure has undergone significant
legal changes in the past twelve years. A chronology of the most important
changes places these developments in perspective.
In 1971 the Mexican Congress amended the tax laws in order to grant
preferential tax treatment to prime foreign lending institutions registered
with the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (hereinafter the "Ministry of
Finance").' The purpose of this amendment was to dissuade Mexican bor-
rowers from negotiating with small foreign lenders and money brokers that
were subject to very high withholding taxes on interest paid by their Mex-
ican borrowers. As is customary in international banking practices, with-
holding taxes on interest earned by the lender are paid by the local borrow-
ers. The withholding taxes applicable to institutions registered with the
Ministry of Finance were assessed by the legislature at 10 percent, vis-a-vis
the 42 percent tax bracket to which non-registered institutions were
subjected.'
During 1972 the Ministry of Finance published a set of rules in the Federal
Official Daily of Mexico (hereinafter the "Official Daily") determining the
registration requirements for the enjoyment of the preferential tax treat-
ment contemplated by the legislature's 1971 amendments.3 Likewise, the
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Ministry of Finance published the rules for the establishment and operations
of representative offices by foreign banks.' These institutions are the only
outlets permitted by Mexican law for foreign lending operations in Mexico.
Until such publication, representative offices had been operating by virtue
of "gentlemen's agreements" executed by the principal officers of the cor-
responding lending institution and the Ministry of Finance.
Up to the end of 1973 and for many years prior thereto, the banking laws
of Mexico contemplated the establishment and operation of branches by
foreign banks. However, for decades no such authorizations were issued by
the Ministry of Finance as a matter of policy and finally, in 1974, the
legislature made the law consistent with such policy and amended the
banking laws to preclude the establishment of branch operations by foreign
banks.' At the same time, the provisions of law concerning establishment of
foreign branches were substituted by an article granting to the Ministry of
Finance discretionary powers to approve the establishment of representa-
tive offices by foreign banks.6
A number of important legislative changes occurred in 1976, including the
publication of rules contemplating the establishment of multiple banking
institutions licensed by the federal government to perform all types of
banking services under one corporate roof. 7 At the end of the year, Mexico
suffered a major devaluation of the Mexican peso-its first in over 20 years.
At the beginning of 1978, the legislature allowed the Ministry of Finance
to issue multiple banking licenses. In this respect, it should be mentioned
that Mexican banks were predicated on the principle of specialized banking.
Amendments to the banking laws were made later in the year, which
allowed foreign and domestic banks to establish branches for offshore
operations in Mexico, subject to rules to be published by the Ministry of
Finance. It is of interest to note that, notwithstanding the availability of this
possibility, the international banking community chose not to apply for the
establishment of such institutions in Mexico.
The new decade of the 1980s began with the Mexican Congress in 1981
amending the banking laws to convert financial leasing companies into
quasi-banking corporations But perhaps the most important changes in the
legal structure of the Mexican banking and financial systems occurred in
1982. These changes included: the publication of rules to establish branches
for offshore operations by foreign and domestic banks9 (although none have
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materialized as of this date); a major devaluation of the Mexican peso;10 the
establishment of dual foreign exchange rates;' the nationalization of all but
two of the private banking corporations;'2 the establishment of generalized
foreign exchange controls;'3 the commencement of litigation challenging the
constitutionality of the nationalization of the private banks; 4 the execution
of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund; amendments to the
Mexican Constitution establishing banking services as a public service not
subject to licensing;'5 the Central Bank becoming a decentralized agency of
the federal government; 6 a telex from the Mexican Minister of Finance to
the international banking community establishing principles for the restruc-
turing of the Mexican public debt; 7 the publication of a new decree relaxing
foreign exchange controls;'8 a further devaluation of the Mexican peso; 'I the
publication of a law regulating banking and credit as a public service;" and
the commencement of a major restructuring of the Mexican public and
private debt.
Nineteen eighty-three saw three major events affect the banking and
financial structure of Mexico. First, in an effort to restructure the Mexican
public debt, the international banking community formed a five-billion
dollar syndication for the Mexican government." Second, the federal gov-
ernment of Mexico established a mechanism to cover the foreign exchange
risks of Mexican borrowers and importers.22 Finally, the Ministry of Finance
published the compensation rules to indemnify the shareholders of the
recently nationalized Mexican banks.23
B. UNCERTAINTY OF THE LEGAL ORGANIZATION AND
STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONALIZED BANKING SYSTEM
The newly nationalized Mexican banking system has not yet been made
subject to clearly defined rules delineating the philosophy that is to guide the
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be changed from commercial corporations into "national credit associa-
tions", it is not clear how such institutions are to be legally structured.
II. Nationalization of Mexican Banks
A. STATUS OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
PRIOR TO NATIONALIZATION
For a number of years, the Mexican banking system witnessed the co-
existence of the so-called "multiple" banking licenses with "specialized"
licenses allowing the undertaking of one or more "compatible" banking
activities. For instance, it was possible for one banking institution to receive
individual licenses from the federal government to undertake desposits,
savings and trust operations. Private Mexican banks, whether "multiple" or
"specialized," co-existed with (a) government-owned "national" credit in-
stitutions, which are agencies for the development of social priorities, such
as construction, industrialization, and public banking; and (b) so-called
"mixed" banks, which are private banking institutions in which a controlling
interest is held by the federal government, participating in such institutions
as a simple investor.
Under the legal system in effect prior to nationalization, all private banks
existed under a license issued by the federal government pursuant to an Act
of Congress entitled the "General Law of Credit Institutions and Auxiliary
Organizations."" Private and public banking institutions were organized in
Mexico as commercial stock corporations with limited liability. The availa-
bility of "multiple" banking licenses stimulated mergers that resulted in the
formation of 35 "multiple" banks out of 127 merging institutions with
various specialized banking licenses. This represented a major effort on the
part of the Mexican government to decrease the number of banking institu-
tions operating in the country. For many years, only one foreign branch had
remained available for deposit banking under a grandfather clause; this is
the branch currently operated by Citibank. Prior to the nationalization
decree, the Mexican banking system consisted of eleven deposit banks, four
investment banks, one mortgage company, five capitalization banks (a
special type of savings institution), twenty-two "national" credit institu-
tions, thirty-five "multiple" banks and four "mixed" banks.'
B. IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF NATIONALIZATION
Although the nationalization appears to have done away with the sepa-
rate existence of the public and private banks, two private banks continue
24Originally published in D.O., May 31, 1941, as amended.
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their operations under licenses from the Mexican government. These are
the Banco Obrero (a "multiple" banking institution owned by the labor
unions), and Citibank, N.A. which, as stated above, is the only branch in
Mexico operated by a foreign bank authorized to undertake deposit bank-
ing. It is significant that "mixed" banks were expressly exempted from the
nationalization decree and that in the nationalization decree the federal
government chose to guarantee all obligations assumed by the recently
nationalized banks. Subsequent to the nationalization decree, the Federal
Constitution of Mexico was amended to: establish banking operations as a
public service that would not be subject in the future to licensing in favor of
private parties, and unionize bank employees. The later amendment had
been strongly resisted in the past by private bankers, who considered
unionization very dangerous to the stability of the Mexican economy.
Together with the amendments to the Federal Constitution of Mexico,
Congress amended the Organic Law of the Central Bank, changing such
bank from a commercial corporation into a decentralized agency of the
federal government.26 The federal government of Mexico formerly held 51
percent of the outstanding shares of the Central Bank corporation, with the
remaining 49 percent held by the various private institutions operating as
banking corporations under licenses granted by the federal government
through the Ministry of Finance. Congress also issued a law which regulates
banking and credit as a public service that in the future is to be rendered, on
an exclusive basis, by "national credit associations," controlled predomi-
nantly by the federal government. These institutions may accept token
private participation.
C. PRESENT STATUS OF THE NATIONALIZED BANKING SYSTEM
Despite the nationalization efforts, Mexico continues to witness the co-
existence of (a) private commercial corporations soon to be converted into
"national credit associations," (b) national credit institutions of importance
such as Nacional Financiera, S.A., Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios
Pdiblicos, S.A. and Banco Nacional de Cr6dito Rural (statutory agencies for
the development of social priorities), (c) mixed banks, soon to be converted
into "national credit associations," and (d) private banking corporations
such as Banco Obrero, S.A. and Citibank's branch. Also, the nationaliza-
tion decree notwithstanding, Mexico continues to have banks that are
enjoying specialized banking licenses to undertake limited banking activi-
ties or multiple banking.
At the present time, there is a certain obsolescence in the banking laws of
Mexico. For example, it is no longer consistent for the federal government
6See supra note 16.
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to police or regulate a public service that is now being rendered by such
government. To add to such inconsistency, nationalized banks now qualify
as companies with government participation, and as such are subject to
special regulations under Mexican administrative law.27 Moreover, national-
ized banks now have a confusing legal structure that is further complicated
by the circumstance that the question concerning the constitutionality of the
nationalization decree is still pending for decision by the Mexican courts.
III. Restructuring of Private and
Public Debt
The principles for the restructuring of the private debt were contained in a
telex that the Mexican Minister of Finance addressed to the international
banking community on December 8, 1982. Thereafter, the international
banking community provided a five-billion U.S. dollar jumbo loan (signed
on March 3, 1983), which was designed to support the Mexican government
during the worst part of the financial crisis, and a number of credit lines from
the major industrialized nations of the world were granted to the govern-
ment in order to expedite foreign trade.
An important effort towards the restructuring of the Mexican public debt
was made evident by an announcement issued on June 29, 1983 concerning
the signing of an agreement between the governments of Mexico and fifteen
industrialized nations, to restructure (with Mexican government support)
the Mexican private external debt with guarantees furnished by foreign
export credit corporations such as the Exim-Bank of the United States.
The standard draft of agreement for the restructuring of the external debt
of all entities of the Mexican public sector provides for the guaranty of the
United Mexican States, and for the signature of the Central Bank of Mexico,
presumably for the purpose of assuring the availability of foreign exchange.
A major feature of this standard form of agreement is a clause therein that
provides for an exclusive choice of New York law. Based on past experi-
ence, there is a very high probability that the Mexican courts may reject such
a provision.
Early signs of the troubles of the Mexican private sector were detected in
1982 when Grupo Industrial Alfa, one of the foremost conglomerates of
Mexico, announced to its creditors that it was suspending payment of its
obligations. This was a harbinger of difficult times to come. On August 4,
1982, an announcement of Alfa's restructuring plans preceded by just one
day the establishment by the Mexican government of a dual exchange
control rate, which represented the first time in modern Mexico that ex-
change controls had been imposed.
"Article 3 Section II, and Articles 46 and 47 of the Organic Law of the Federal Public
Administration.
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Efforts to restructure the private debt have been subject to uncertainties
with respect to the availability of collateral, conflicts of interest, especially as
between foreign creditors, and many other problems. Conflicts of interest
have also arisen as a result of the presence of a number of factors or
circumstances that may affect the foreign creditors, such as the following:
secured versus unsecured loans; individual versus syndicated lenders; litiga-
tion oriented versus settlement oriented philosophies; money-center banks
versus regional banks; bank creditors versus supply creditors; Mexican
banks versus foreign banks; feasibility of the Mexican borrower as a going
concern; borrower's capacity to generate pesos or dollars; foreign exchange
risks prompted by the possibility of future devaluations; flexibility of not-
yet-tested governmental mechanisms to adapt to individual cases; bank-
ruptcy or suspension of payments (counterpart of United States Chapter
Eleven proceedings) of some major Mexican industrial groups; formation of
a growing number of informal creditors' committees (steering committees)
of many large Mexican borrowers; lenders of large industrial groups faced
with individual companies' corporate veils; and unavailability of specialized
Mexican counsel.
IV. Conclusion
It is obvious in the light of the foregoing that many problems remain in
connection with Mexico's recent nationalization of private Mexican banks
and satisfaction of Mexico's public and private foreign debt.
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